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Human Terrain Systems
and the Moral Prosecution
of Warfare
Dan G.Cox

T

here is a growing consensus that cultural variables play an integral role
in conflict mitigation. Whether one believes we are truly in a “long war,”
in which capturing “hearts and minds” is integral, or whether one thinks that
a major combat operation is looming on the horizon, cultural knowledge and
understanding of the area of operation are instrumental to success.
The recently developed and implemented Human Terrain System
(HTS) Project was designed to play an important role in developing cultural
knowledge for the US military and is critical to mission success and the moral
prosecution of warfare.1 But this program is new and, admittedly, not perfect.
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) were designed to play a key, on-the-ground role
in bridging the cultural and personal identity gap between western military
forces and the foreign cultures in which they operate. This is an extremely
important but often overlooked aspect of “just war” theory. A deeper understanding of not only adversarial but friendly culture and personal identity
formation allows the US military to better discriminate between friend and foe
and to build deeper relationships with local leaders. These measures create a
more precise and humane war effort than if the United States was forced to rely
solely on indiscriminate, blunt, and largely kinetic options. The US military
does not have the ability to veto a political decision to go to war or abscond
from any order to engage overseas. Having said this, the US military does have
a great say in how a campaign will be conducted and HTS was designed to
play an integral role in ensuring that a campaign is conducted as morally and
unobtrusively as possible.
In a general sense, the US military needs to be permitted the latitude
to conduct a moral and honorable campaign regardless of the circumstances
that brought the military into the conflict. Any military that is professional and
honorable is not exonerated from conducting a moral war simply because the
decision to go to war is being vigorously challenged. There has to be a separation, as Michael Walzer states, between jus ad bellum (the justice of war or the
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justice of the initiation of war) and jus in bello (justice in war or justice in the
practice of war).2 Any ability the United States has that does not violate human
rights, the US Constitution, US legislation, or the military’s rules of engagement (ROE) needs to be considered. There is a small but vociferous chorus of
pundits and academics who are attempting to discredit and marginalize the
HTS Project. The purpose of this article is to counter this cohort by showing
that when one attempts to link arguments against HTS to the justness of a war,
the argument quickly falls apart. In fact, HTS is critical to the moral conduct of
war, and prohibiting this practice, especially if there is no replacement program,
will make it nearly impossible for US forces to effectively and morally conduct
warfare in divergent cultures.

The Arguments Against HTS: A False Link to Jus ad Bellum
Anthropology, apparently as a nearly unified field (if one considers
the governing body to speak for the majority of anthropologists), is the most
vocal audience criticizing HTS. These claims are key to the discussion as many
contain jus ad bellum arguments directed against HTS. Several prominent
anthropologists claim that US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are
illegitimate and, therefore, so is HTS. Other moral arguments against HTS
from anthropologists stem from the belief that anthropology, as a field, will
be sullied if its members collude with the military in combat environments
abroad. These claims have gone largely unchallenged, but as this article will
detail, these arguments fail to account for the basic right of the nation and its
soldiers to conduct moral warfare.
One of the main reasons anthropologists and other critics of HTS are
calling for an end to this project stems from these critics’s belief that US involvement in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is unjust. Anthropologist Marshall
Sahlins claims that HTS operatives are attempting to manipulate local culture
and help the US government impose its will on indigenous populations while
also acting as spies for the American government.3 Often, these arguments
against HTS are linked to claims of spying or targeting of civilians by the military. It is a short leap from such assertions to claims that HTS is engaging in war
crimes similar to ones these authors believe occurred during the Vietnam War.4
Roberto Gonzalez compares HTTs directly to Operation Phoenix in
Vietnam. Gonzalez claims that HTTs are providing the same targeting information which is being used to inform hit squads as it was, in his view, so unjustly
used during the Vietnam War.5 Gonzalez argues that “HTS was created as
an espionage program” similar to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS) organization in Vietnam and we should
assume HTS, as a replica of CORDS, will target “tens of thousands of people
for ‘neutralization.’”6 Hugh Gusterson compares the use of anthropologists in
counterinsurgency to the use of social scientists during the Vietnam era and
warns that the “best and brightest” anthropologists are prepared this time as
“the academy’s most left-leaning discipline . . . many people become anthropologists out of a visceral sympathy for the kinds of people who all too often
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show up as war’s collateral damage.”7 Gusterson, who cofounded with David
Price the Network of Concerned Anthropologists, has garnered over 1,000
signatures from anthropologists condemning HTS. He goes on to note that the
Pentagon will likely get less qualified anthropologists to do its bidding in the
counterinsurgency environment and that this will lead to more errors occurring
in various operations, not less.8
Another critical argument against the unjustness of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan and the involvement of HTS links these wars to perceived
colonialism. David Price argues the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan amount to
nothing more than illegal occupations and that President Obama is using “counterinsurgency as a tool to conquer peoples who have historically been difficult,
if not impossible, for outside colonial powers to dominate.”9 Gonzalez also cries
foul in his book on HTS asking, “Should social scientists use expert knowledge
for social engineering, manipulation, and targeting of people living in societies
under illegal occupation by the US?”10
This article is not aimed at debating the justness of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the justness of the decision to go to war
in these locales does not matter at all with regard to the use of HTS. There is
an attribution error contained within these arguments against HTS. Even if
one accepts the premise that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were unjust, that
does not lead to the conclusion that laudable attempts to provide vital cultural
knowledge and awareness to commanders in these theaters is incorrect. Military
commanders do not choose their wars, but they do have a constitutional duty
to prosecute them. Just war encompasses more than the simple decision to go
to war. It encompasses jus in bello or the just conduct of the war. Hence, when
Hugh Gustersen relates that an anthropological colleague of his confronted
him with the challenge that anthropological ethics should not trump national
security, and he correctly points out that the choice “between anthropology and
national security is wrong-headed,”11 he still misses the point. The real choice
is between anthropological and military ethics, and it remains far less clear that
anthropological considerations should trump military ethics, especially in the
just conduct of war.

HTS and Jus in Bello
One needs to understand that there is a clear distinction between the
justness of the declaration of war and the justness of the conduct of the war.
Michael Walzer notes that there are “rules of engagement that apply even to
soldiers whose wars are criminal.”12 But Walzer is not the only seminal figure
in the just war debate to assert this position. What follows is a brief overview of
some of the propositions by key figures in the just war debate with an emphasis
on the development of jus in bello.
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Jus in Bello: The Necessity for Any Military to Conduct an Honorable
Campaign
In Book XIX, Chapter 7, of the City of God, Saint Augustine explains
his concept of just war and provides insight into the heart and mind of a moral
warrior. War, in all its forms, is rightly explained as horrible and something
that should not be entered into lightly. One is begrudgingly dragged into war.
As Augustine puts it, “For it is the wrong-doing of the imposing party which
compels a wise man to wage just wars.”13 Further, he elucidates that war cannot
be avoided by simply ignoring unjust suffering. If one avoids war by ignoring
the inequity of the adversary, then that person is not just and has lost all human
feeling.14 In other words, warriors and war decisionmakers need to approach
the possibility of war with an empathetic heart. Finally, in Book XV, Chapter
4, Augustine notes that a leader moved to war should bear in mind the ultimate
goal of obtaining a peace. As Augustine states, “For it desires earthly peace for
the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and it makes war in order to attain peace;
since, if it has conquered, and there remains no one to resist it, it enjoys a peace
which it had not while there were opposing parties who contested for the enjoyment of those things which were too small to satisfy both.”15
Augustine’s thoughts point to the need for empathy and compassion
when deciding to go to war, and one can assume these characteristics will not be
lost while engaging in that war. Also, in the spirit of soldiers being driven to war
by the adversary’s “wrong-doing,” Michael Walzer notes that we hold soldiers
“to certain standards, even though they fight unwillingly—in fact, precisely
because we assume that they fight unwillingly.”16 Finally, Thomas Aquinas
speaks to those waging war having “rightful intention” in which wars are waged
“not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing
peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good” [italics removed].17
The disposition of the just warrior is important to all three authors and the standards which soldiers in a just or unjust war are to be held remain paramount.
But what are these standards for soldiers who want to prosecute an honorable, just war? The two main components of jus in bello are discrimination
and proportionality. Discrimination simply means that the soldier is disciplined
and aware enough to place potential targets into categories based on combatant
status. An enemy soldier in military uniform firing on an American soldier is
the clearest case of a combatant who can be engaged in kind. A clearly unarmed
child crying in the middle of a street would fall under the noncombatant status
and be subject to no military coercion. It is the moral soldier’s duty to discern
between the two and act accordingly.18 Discrimination implies the soldier has
decent intelligence of the area and people and a reasonable understanding of
local culture. For the foreseeable future, enemy combatants will try to blend
in with civilian population. This obvious deception by the enemy does not
give any military the right to kill indiscriminately. As Walzer writes, “A legitimate act of war is one that does not violate the rights of the people whom it is
directed.”19 Therefore, any information the US military can gather, which helps
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a soldier discriminate between combatant and noncombatant, goes a long way
toward helping the American military engage in the just prosecution of war.
The discussion regarding discrimination thus far has focused solely on
people who intend to directly harm those they fight, whether or not they wear an
identifiable military uniform or deceptively don civilian clothing. The distinction between combatant and noncombatant becomes even more troublesome
when one attempts to discern if those supporting direct combatants should
themselves be categorized as combatants. Hugo Grotius notes that this is a
persistent question in the just war debate but that “it is evident that any one must
be ranked as an enemy, who supplies an enemy with the means of prosecuting
hostilities.”20 Walzer adds to this by noting that combatant status can be carefully extended to munitions manufacturers and those who supply the modern
military machine with “a continuing stream of equipment, fuel, ammunition,
food, and so on.”21 These propositions are further confounded by new challenges
presented in 21st century conflict. While it may have been difficult to target the
proper factory producing munitions in World War II, it is almost impossible to
discern who is providing safe housing and food to insurgents, guerillas, and
terrorists. Such discernment cannot be made without deep understanding and
development of high-context relationships in a foreign country and culture.
Further, it is easy to see a munitions factory as a legitimate military target,
but it is far harder to argue for targeting a bakery that may provide some of its
bread to the enemy. Still, cultural understanding will aid American soldiers
in understanding why the baker is supporting the enemy, and such knowledge
may lead to nonkinetic solutions.
As difficult as it is to develop discrimination between combatants and
noncombatants in times of conflict, it is equally as difficult to determine proportionality in a military response. But it is no less important for the moral
warrior. The Dutch theologian Grotius speaks to proportionality arguing,
“When punishment is lawful and just, all the means absolutely necessary to
enforce its execution are also lawful and just, and every act that forms part
of the punishment, such as destroying an enemy’s property and country by
fire or any other way, falls within the limits of justice proportionable to the
offence.”22 But this is a tricky calculus and as the Prussian military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz notes, war tends toward absolutes and can quickly become
uncontrollable.23 Clausewitz argues that war is the “continuation of policy by
other means”24 and that civilized nations can show far more restraint in war
than a conflict between savages.25 But this restraint or proportional response
is not bounded by an absolute law governing warfare. It is bound by social
agreements between warring parties and it is, unfortunately, probable that
emotion will trump rationality in warfare leading to Clausewitz’s greatest fear
of an escalation in violence and lack of restraint on the part of both warring
factions.26 Despite all this, military officers are required to train and discipline
those who violate jus in bello; such a relationship requires the officer to have a
deeper understanding of proportionality than the “commonsense requirement
that attacks be proportionate to the military value of the target.”27

Autumn 2011

23

Dan G.Cox

For the soldier, war involves injury, killing, and destruction but these
can never be an end for a moral warrior and these actions should always be
aimed at the ultimate end of peace.28 This means that the ultimate aim is to
disarm your adversary, not necessarily kill the enemy. Out of this logic comes
the 1949 Geneva Conventions which provide certain protections to soldiers
who surrender. Those who lay down their arms become subject to certain
rights as a prisoner of war, including medical aid and honorable treatment of
the individual taken prisoner.29 Again, the Geneva Conventions are instructive
and in Article 3, subsection 1C, prisoners are not to suffer, “outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” While
this seems prima facie obvious, it is not easy to discern what “humiliating and
degrading treatment” is on the battlefield when one is operating in a foreign
culture. For example, the simple act of hand searching a suspected combatant in
Afghanistan could have devastating consequences to that individual if proper
care is not taken to remove the suspected combatant from public view. If the
person is quickly determined not to be an enemy combatant, the damage of
searching him in a public forum might be irreparable. Deep knowledge of the
local culture is necessary for soldiers to properly carry out their tasks in an
honorable and efficient manner.
What does this insight mean to the soldier in the field? Proportionality
of response is key to not only conducting a just campaign but also to prevent
an escalation of hostilities inching ever more dangerously to unrestrained, total
war. All actions on the battlefield need to be scrutinized for second, third, and
fourth-order effects, ensuring that the main objective of peace is not lost in the
emotional heat of engagement. Any armed force should be allowed to maintain
its honor in war, regardless of whether or not the decision to go to war was
just. All of this implies that any military engaging in battle should have a keen
understanding of the battlefield: the culture they are immersing themselves
in; the key local, regional, and national players; the motives of the people; and
other factors too enumerable to list.

The Importance of Cultural Understanding
Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are distinct characteristics of war. While
one can influence the other, there is no reasonable argument that can be made
claiming that an unjustly declared war necessarily mandates an unjustly conducted war. As Walzer contends, there should be a line “between the war itself,
for which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct of the war, for which
they are responsible.”30 There are numerous illustrations of soldiers and military leaders engaging in just war practices in the face of unjustly declared wars
and in contradiction to unjust guidance from national leaders, just as there
are instances of soldiers and leaders engaging in unjust acts even though the
cause of the war is just. The key is to examine jus in bello as a continuum. No
just war can be fought without collateral damage or even individual instances
of injustice. The goal should be to come as close as one can to the impossible
aspiration of a perfectly conducted war. What follows are examples of what
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has been described above followed by illustrations of how HTS can provide
the proper cultural understanding required in 21st century conflicts and aid the
American military to come as close as possible to the goal of jus in bello.
The German decision to engage in war against multiple states in World
War II is a widely accepted example of an unjust war. As unjust as the war
was, General Edwin Rommel refused to be corrupted by it and was noted for
fighting “a bad war well, not only militarily but also morally.”31 One example of
Rommel’s commitment to jus in bello in the face of an unjust directive exemplifies why it is so important to separate the two concepts. Adolf Hitler issued the
Commando Order to Rommel on 28 October 1942. In this order, Hitler directed
Rommel to kill all enemy soldiers they encountered behind their lines. Rommel
burned this order in front of others and refused to carry it out, showing that his
commitment to honorable warfare practices outweighed even his duty to the
German national leader.32
Unfortunately, the opposite can happen as well as soldiers and military leaders can violate jus in bello despite the overall justness of the war.
The intensity of combat generally brought out the best in American soldiers
during World War II, but conflict can also produce some isolated examples of
bad conduct. Most of the war crimes committed by American soldiers came
out of a justifiable passion that might explain, but cannot excuse, such acts. A
particularly chilling example of this from historian Stephen Ambrose serves to
exemplify how a justly declared war can be unjustly prosecuted:
Pvt. Edward Webber of the 47th Infantry Regiment described a gruesome, but hardly unique, incident. He was advancing on a damaged
German tank. The crew had ceased firing its machine gun, opened
the turret, and were waving the white flag. Webber and his buddies
moved forward. The machine gun began firing again—probably by
some young fanatic who refused to give up with the rest. Webber’s
squad fired back. “The crew came pouring out of the bottom escape
hatch,” Webber said. “They were hollering ‘Nicht schiessen! Nicht
schiessen!’ But by this time we were infuriated with rage. The
crewmen were lined up on their knees and an angry soldier walked
along behind them and shot each in the back of the head. The last
to die was a young, blond-headed teenager who was rocking back
and forth on his knees, crying and urinating down both trouser legs.
He had pictures of his family spread on the ground before him.
Nevertheless, he was shot in the back of the head and pitched forth
like a sack of potatoes.33

These incidents occur in any prolonged conflict despite the justness or
unjustness of the initial declaration of war. The point here is how, and to what
degree, a military attempts to mitigate the frequency of these events. In the case
described above, proper training is aimed at controlling emotional reactions
which result in war crimes being committed, but the example also goes a long
way toward explaining how and when training would reasonably be expected
to break down.
How do these examples relate to HTS? The answer begins with two
observations drawn from each of the cases. First, as was true in the case of
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General Rommel’s decision to disregard an unjust executive directive given
during the campaigning of an unjustly declared war, all leaders and soldiers
have the right to honorably conduct their warfare activities, regardless of the
overall justness of the war declaration. Second, the misconduct of American
soldiers during World War II was likely due to a lack of discipline in a highly
charged environment resulting, at least in a number of cases, from inadequate
training and experience.
In modern warfare, a premium is placed on understanding the culture
one is operating in for the same reasons as the counterinsurgency expert David
Galula identified from his experience of operating in multiple insurgencies. He
notes that successful counterinsurgency is twenty percent military action and
eighty percent political.34 A modern soldier’s tasks are expanded to “propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout”35
argues Galula and one could add microfinancier, infrastructure builder, diplomat, and arbiter of local disputes to the list. The point is that modern warfare
has been operating and will continue to operate for the foreseeable future in
environments where the military is tasked with performing a wide array of
nonkinetic activities. Current US Army doctrine supports this assertion. FM
3-07 directs that “for military forces, however, stability tasks are executed continuously throughout all operations” and that “leaders will increasingly call on
stability operations to reduce the drivers of conflict.”36
These nonkinetic and kinetic actions will occur in far distant lands
where the population speaks a foreign dialect, lives in distinct cultures, and
holds a very non-Western view of the world. The gulf of circumspection and
mistrust between people of vastly different cultures is best exemplified by this
quotation from Saint Augustine:
And here, in the first place, man is separated from man by the difference of languages. For if two men, each ignorant of the other’s
language, meet, and are not compelled to pass, but, on the contrary, to
remain in company, dumb animals, though of different species, would
more easily hold intercourse than they, human beings though they
be. For their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are
prevented by diversity of language from conveying their sentiments
to one another; so that a man would more readily hold intercourse
with his dog than with a foreigner.37

If the opportunity for misunderstanding is this great between people who do
not share a common language, imagine how great it might become when these
same individuals fail to share a common culture, religion, or worldview.
This is the void of understanding that HTS attempts to fill. HTS permits
soldiers, leaders, and even interagency collaborators in a joint effort to build highcontext relationships with the local populace while developing an awareness of
cultures. Greater efficiencies can be gained so that military and civilian organizations may avoid the cultural faux pas that anger locals and lead to violence.
This idea is gaining relevance as writers on counterinsurgency increasingly refer to the need for a cultural appreciation in an effort to effectively
counteract insurgent forces and movements. The counterinsurgency theorist
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David Kilcullen identifies three pillars of counterinsurgency—security, political, and economic—resting on a foundation of understanding about the “human
terrain” associated with a particular operation.38 Pauline Kusiak, a sociocultural
expert, argues that understanding the role of identity, culture, tribe, family,
religion, and similar factors, is key to comprehending what fuels a conflict
and where the sympathies may be for those involved.39 Kusiak emphasizes the
importance of both HTS and civilian ethnographic researchers to this process.
No matter how much the military trains its own experts, the deliberate effort to
“see the world through someone else’s eyes” requires full-time dedication that
only an accredited researcher can devote to the process.40
Task Force Dragon (TF Dragon) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) V
discovered that attempts to separate insurgents from the population rested
heavily on a deep understanding of the human terrain.41 TF Dragon found the
simple act of attempting to learn the local culture demonstrated a “commitment
to local communities” which, in turn, allowed a trust relationship to develop.42
The concept of analyzing and understanding the human terrain is emphasized
in current US military doctrine. The Army’s counterinsurgency manual, FM
3-24, refers to the need to understand and define the operational environment
which includes an understanding of family, tribal, ethnic, and religious links
between groups and people as well as an understanding of society, social structure, culture, language, power authority, and the interests of people and groups.43
Social scientist Montgomery McFate places this into a strategic, operational, and tactical perspective. She argues that misunderstanding foreign
cultures at the strategic level results in ignorant policies that only exacerbate
an insurgency, while misunderstanding at the operational level can result in
a backlash of negative public opinion. Misunderstanding at the tactical level
is even more dangerous as McFate postulates it can endanger “both civilians
and troops.”44 An example of this type of tactical disaster is important. What
follows below was related to the author by Major Philip Carlson in an interview
conducted in January 2009. Major Carlson describes his initial Human Terrain
Team’s (HTT) experience while interacting with a rural tribal culture in Iraq
and the disaster that was narrowly averted through a quick reframing of initial
cultural indicators.
Major Carlson describes the initial interaction with the local population
as follows:
My very first time out in an HTT in Iraq, we had a company airmobile to the countryside because of the IED threat on the road. We
were attached to a very proficient patrol fire squadron in the 2nd ACR
which was carrying out random interviews and knock and search
operations. We had a problem with our interpreters who were young,
gung-ho, Shi’ites who were motivated to capture terrorists. In one
house we, the patrol, found an older gentleman named Alawi with
a closet full of religious information and a scope for what was later
determined to be an air rifle which locals use for shooting birds that
kill the honey bees which locals rely on to produce honey for sale in
village markets. The interpreters became extremely animated when
they found the scope and some Arabic documents and they claimed
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that the books were jihadist in nature and the scope was for a sophisticated sniper rifle.45

It was not surprising what followed. In most cases, Alawi’s arrest and
detention would comprise the totality of the immediate story as patrols and commands lacking proper cultural awareness or expertise have to rely on the aptitude
and honesty of their interpreters who end up serving simultaneously as linguistic
and local cultural decipherers. Major Carlson continued:
Alawi was cuffed and detained and later paraded through the village
back to the patrol base. We later found out he was the pride of the
village and one of the most respected men. Our cultural expert, Dr.
Ammar, was not initially convinced that Alawi was a radical. Dr.
Ammar started analyzing the literature we received and determined
one book was an elementary level textreader, one was a grammar
book, and one was on Arabic history. None of the materials was
extremist in any way. Alawi turned out to be a kindly old school
teacher.46

At this point the commander, aware of the grave mistake which had been
made, wanted to immediately release Alawi in an effort to right the wrongful
arrest and to quell tensions with the local populace. It took a deep cultural expert,
however, to point out that simply releasing Alawi would do little to restore his
honor and place in society.
Alawi was to be released immediately, but Dr. Ammar pointed out
that there was a process to the release that must be followed to restore
Alawi’s honor and repair the damage. We phoned his cousin to come
pick him up. Four men, one being Alawi’s cousin, and a young boy
showed up to the patrol base. The commander, the XO, and I all publically and profusely apologized for the mistake we had made and any
affront we had made to Alawi. Alawi’s honor was restored.

Interestingly, despite the incident beginning with an error on the part of
the military, the proper handling of the situation did more than just return the
disposition of the local populace to neutral. Because the US officers, at the behest
of the HTT expert, displayed the proper cultural respect and understanding, the
local populace befriended the military operatives in their village.
But what is more amazing is that this simple, culturally appropriate
righting of a wrong in the proper frame of justice surprised everyone
in the village. The news spread like wild fire. While we were there, no
troops were sniped at or mortared and soon after Esmat, the son of the
late Muktar, who was former leader of the village, showed us where
a deep IED was buried, where eighty mortar tubes were hidden, and
where two functioning anti-aircraft guns were hidden. Esmat would
later take over the role of leader of the village and began using the
title of sheikh. Esmat was always cooperative and willing to help after
we resolved the incident with Alawi. That is the power of understanding and operating appropriately within a culture.47

Major Carlson’s experience with his HTT exemplifies the power of
engaging in honorable warfare and the proper discriminating between combatants and noncombatants. One might argue that since Alawi was not fired upon,
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injured, or killed, this is a poor example of discrimination, but this would
miss a key aspect of 21st century conflict. In conflict between and within
distinct milieus, slighting the honor of an innocent can cause just as much
damage as killing the individual. Imagine if the US military had not caught
their error and properly restored Alawi’s honor. A deep IED might have been
targeted against US forces along with the mortars and antiaircraft guns. The
military would have had to respond with force. No high-context relationships
would have been forged. Distrust and hatred would have been sown and the
insurgency would have blossomed rather than dimished.

Conclusion
When one combines an understanding of jus in bello with the increasing need for US forces to operate in foreign cultures, it becomes imperative
that HTSs not only be deployed but that they are encouraged to prosper and
grow. Jus ad bellum arguments against US military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have no bearing on the use of HTS. The US military does not, and
should not, have any influence on the decision to go to war. That is a matter for
the polity in democratic republics. The US military needs to be able to exercise
all available means to perpetrate a morally sound campaign while discriminating between combatants and noncombatants in a jus in bello environment.
In the midst of a counterinsurgency battle, a premium is placed on
“winning hearts and minds,” but this is an empty concept if the individuals
involved do not know what moves the hearts and minds of the local populace.
Human Terrain Systems and the HTTs they deploy in the battlespace provide
knowledge and understanding of diverse foreign cultures, how and why personal
identities are formed in a specific locality, and how one can most effectively
interact with these individuals. HTS assists the US military in developing
and maintaining high-context relationships integral to successful operations.
Without this knowledge and an understanding of these relationships, the military would simply become a lumbering giant that is more likely than not to step
on the collective toes of those it is trying to help.
All HTTs have not performed equally and HTS is not a perfect project.
Yet even if the naysayers win the intellectual battle and the HTS project is
terminated, the need for cultural understanding on the battlefield remains. A
band of vociferous social scientists should not decide the fate of a program
they have mistakenly cast as a moral debate without some consideration for the
moral warrior. As George Lucas correctly relates in his book, Anthropologists
in Arms, social scientists on the battlefield would be more correctly viewed as
doctors providing aid to both sides in the conflict by mitigating the cruelty of war
through treating the injured.48 Social scientists providing military commanders
with accurate cultural information are no different. Without an understanding
of the operational environment, commanders run a far greater risk of creating
the collateral damage that critics of HTS claim so vehemently to oppose.
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